Iraq War
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The Iraq War, also known as the Second Gulf War or the Occupation of Iraq,[33] is an ongoing military campaign which began on March 20, 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by a multinational force now led by and composed almost entirely of troops from the United States and United Kingdom.[34]
Prior to the war, the U.S. and U.K. claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a serious and imminent threat to their security and that of their coalition allies.[35][36][37] United Nations weapons inspectors found no evidence of WMD, giving support to earlier criticism of poor intelligence on the subject.[38][39][40][41][42] After the invasion, the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its WMD programs in 1991 and had no active programs at the time of the invasion, but that they intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted.[43] Although some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons for which the coalition invaded.[44] Some U.S. officials also accused Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting Al-Qaeda,[45] but no evidence of any collaborative relationship was ever found.[46][47] Bush reportedly told Palestinian officials either that God inspired him to end the tyranny in Iraq, or to hit Saddam.[48] Other reasons for the invasion stated by U.S. officials included Iraq's financial support for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers,[49] Iraqi government human rights abuses,[50] and spreading democracy.[51] Some officials said that Iraq's oil reserves played a role in the decision to invade,[52][53][54][55][56][57] but other officials denied that.[58][59][60]
The invasion led to the quick defeat of the Iraqi military, and the eventual capture and execution of Saddam Hussein. The U.S.-led coalition occupied Iraq and attempted to establish a new democratic government. However, violence against coalition forces and among various sectarian groups soon led to asymmetric warfare with the Iraqi insurgency, strife between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and al-Qaeda operations in Iraq.[61][62] The number of Iraqis killed through 2007 ranges from "a conservative cautious minimum" of more than 85,000 civilians[63][64] to a survey estimate of more than 1,000,000 citizens.[26] UNHCR estimates the war uprooted 4.7 million Iraqis through April 2008 (about 16% of the population of Iraq), two million of whom had fled to neighbouring countries[65] fleeing a humanitarian situation that the Red Cross described in March 2008 as "among the most critical in the world".[66] In June 2008, U.S. defense officials claimed security and economic indicators began to show signs of improvement in what they hailed as significant and fragile gains.[67][68] In August 2008, Iraq was fifth on the Failed States Index.[69] Member nations of the Coalition withdrew their forces as public opinion favoring troop withdrawals increased and as Iraqi forces began to take responsibility for security.[70][71]
In late 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments approved a Status of Forces Agreement. The pact establishes that U.S. combat forces will withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and that all U.S. forces will be completely out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. The agreement may be renegotiated to delay withdrawal, and an Iraqi referendum scheduled for mid-2009 may require all U.S. forces to completely leave by the middle of 2010.[72][73] The pact requires criminal charges for holding prisoners over 24 hours, and requires a warrant for searches of homes and buildings that are not related to combat.[74] U.S. contractors working for U.S. forces will be subject to Iraqi criminal law, while contractors working for the State Department and other U.S. agencies may retain their immunity. If U.S. forces commit still undecided "major premeditated felonies" while off-duty and off-base, they will be subject to the still undecided procedures laid out by a joint U.S.-Iraq committee if the U.S. certifies the forces were off-duty.[75][76][77][74] Several groups of Iraqis protested the passing of the SOFA accord,[78][79][80] and Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani expressed concern the pact did not do enough to limit occupation forces.[81] The Iraqi Parliament also ratified a Strategic Framework Agreement with the U.S.,[82] aimed at ensuring international cooperation including minority ethnicity, gender, and belief interests and other constitutional rights; threat deterrence; exchange students; education;[83] and cooperation in the areas of energy development, environmental hygiene, health care, information technology, communications, and law enforcement.[84]
[edit] 1991–2000: U.N. inspectors, no-fly zones, and Iraqi opposition groups
- See also: Oil-for-Food Programme and Operation Northern Watch
Following the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 mandated that Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear, and long range missile programs be halted and all such weapons destroyed under United Nations Special Commission control. U.N. weapons inspectors inside Iraq were able to verify the destruction of a large amount of WMD-material, but substantial issues remained unresolved in 1998 when the inspectors left Iraq due to then current UNSCOM head Richard Butler's belief that U.S. and UK military action was imminent. Shortly after the inspectors withdrew, the U.S. and UK launched a four-day bombing campaign. Also, during this period the US congress and President Clinton issued a resolution calling for regime change in Iraq.
In addition to the inspection regimen, the U.S. and UK (along with France until 1998) engaged in a low-level conflict with Iraq by enforcing northern and southern Iraqi no-fly zones. These zones were created following the Persian Gulf War to protect Iraqi Kurdistan in the north and the southern Shia areas, and were seen by the Iraqi government as an infringement of Iraq's sovereignty. The no-fly zones prohibited unauthorized fixed-wing aircraft but allowed Iraqi helicopters or limited Turkish bombing runs[85][86]. Iraqi air-defense installations and American and British air patrols regularly exchanged fire during this five year period.
Approximately one year before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. initiated Operation Southern Focus as a change to its response strategy, by increasing the overall number of missions and selecting targets throughout the no-fly zones in order to disrupt the military command structure in Iraq. The weight of bombs dropped on Iraq increased from none in March 2002 and 0.3 short tons (0.27 t) in April to between 8 short tons (7.3 t) to 14 short tons (13 t) per month in May-August. The total reached a pre-war peak of 54.6 short tons (49.5 t) in September 2002.
[edit] Iraqi expatriate opposition groups
Following the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush signed a presidential finding directing the Central Intelligence Agency to create conditions for Hussein's removal in May 1991. Coordinating anti-Saddam groups was an important element of this strategy and the Iraqi National Congress (INC), led by Ahmed Chalabi, was the main group tasked with this purpose. The name INC was reportedly coined by public relations expert John Rendon (of the Rendon Group agency) and the group received millions in covert funding in the 1990s, and then about $8 million a year in overt funding after the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. Another opposition group was the Iraqi National Accord which continues to have influence in the current Iraqi government through its leader Ayad Allawi.
[edit] Presidential involvement
In late April 1993, the United States learned that Saddam Hussein had attempted to have former President George H. W. Bush assassinated during a visit to Kuwait on April 16.[87] On June 16, as per order of then-President Clinton, a cruise missile was shot at the Iraq Intelligence Service building in downtown Baghdad, by way of retaliation. Clinton briefed President-elect George W. Bush in December 2000, expressing his regret that the world's two most dangerous individuals, including Saddam, were still at large. He warned that Saddam will "cause you a world of problems."[88]
[edit] 2001–2003: Iraq disarmament crisis and pre-war intelligence
- See also: Rationale for the Iraq War, Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq, Governments' pre-war positions on invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, 10 Days to War, and Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
According to documents provided by former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, Bush instructed his aides to look for a way to overthrow the Iraqi regime ten days after taking office in January, 2001. A secret memo entitled, "Plan for post-Saddam Iraq," was discussed in January and February of 2001, and a Pentagon document, dated March 5, 2001, and entitled "Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts," included a map of potential areas for exploration.[52][53]
[edit] U.N. weapons inspections resume
The issue of Iraq's disarmament reached a crisis in 2002-2003, when President Bush demanded a complete end to alleged Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction and full compliance with UN Resolutions requiring UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspected weapons production facilities. Previously, the UN had prohibited Iraq from developing or possessing such weapons after the Gulf War and required Iraq to permit inspections confirming compliance.
During 2002, Bush repeatedly backed demands for unfettered inspection and disarmament with threats of military force. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 Iraq reluctantly agreed to new inspections in late 2002. The results of these inspections were mixed, with the inspectors discovering no WMD programs but concluding that Iraqi declarations failed to prove that all such weapons had been properly destroyed.
[edit] Alleged weapons of mass destruction
In the initial stages of the war on terror, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under George Tenet, was rising to prominence as the lead agency in the Afghanistan war. But when Tenet insisted in his personal meetings with President Bush that there was no connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq, Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated a secret program to re-examine the evidence and marginalize the CIA and Tenet. A major part of this program was a Pentagon unit known as the Office of Special Plans (OSP), which was created by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and headed by Douglas Feith. It was created to supply senior Bush administration officials with raw intelligence pertaining to Iraq, unvetted by intelligence analysts, and circumventing traditional intelligence gathering operations by the CIA. The questionable intelligence acquired by the OSP was "stovepiped" to Cheney and presented to the public. In some cases, Cheney’s office would leak the intelligence to news correspondents, who would in turn cover it in such outlets such as The New York Times. Cheney would subsequently appear on the Sunday political television talk shows to discuss the intelligence, referencing The New York Times as the source to give it credence.[89]
Prior to the Gulf War, in 1990, Iraq had stockpiled 550 short tons (500 t) of yellowcake uranium at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex about 20 kilometres (12 mi) south of Baghdad.[90] In late February 2002, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph Wilson to investigate reports that Iraq was attempting to purchase additional yellowcake from Niger. Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were "unequivocally wrong." The Bush administration, however, continued to allege Iraq's attempts to obtain additional yellowcake were a justification for military action - most prominently in the January, 2003 State of the Union address when President Bush said that Iraq had sought uranium, citing British intelligence sources.[91] In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent. Wilson's report did not clarify the matter for analysts, but they found it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales.[92] Shortly after Wilson's op-ed, the identity of Wilson's wife, undercover CIA analyst Valerie Plame, was revealed in a column by Robert Novak. Since it is a felony to reveal the identity of a CIA agent Novak's column launched an investigation by the Justice Department into the source of the leak. In March, 2007, Dick Cheney’s Chief of Staff I. Lewis 'Scooter' Libby was convicted of perjury in the Plame leak investigation. The source of the leak was found to be former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, who was never charged with the crime.[93] In June 2008, Representative Henry Waxman called on the Justice Department to release unredacted transcripts of the FBI interviews in which Libby stated that it was "possible" that Vice President Cheney instructed him to release the information to the press.[94]
On May 1, 2005 the "Downing Street memo" was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret July 23, 2002 meeting among UK Labour government, defense, and intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war — including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated, "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."[95]
On September 18, 2002, George Tenet briefed Bush that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction. Bush dismissed this top-secret intelligence from Saddam's inner circle which was approved by two senior CIA officers, but it turned out to be completely accurate. The information was never shared with Congress or even CIA agents examining whether Saddam had such weapons.[96] The CIA had contacted Saddam Hussein's foreign minister, Naji Sabri, who was being paid by the French as an agent. Sabri informed them that Saddam had ambitions for a nuclear program but that it was not active, and that no biological weapons were being produced or stockpiled, although research was underway.[97]
In September 2002, the Bush administration, the CIA and the DIA said attempts by Iraq to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, which were prohibited under the UN monitoring program, pointed to a clandestine effort to make enriched uranium for nuclear bombs.[98] This analysis was opposed by the Department of Energy (DOE) and INR which was significant because of DOE's expertise in gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs. The DOE and INR argued that such tubes were poorly suited for centrifuges.[99] An effort by the DOE to change Powell's comments before his UN appearance was rebuffed by the administration.[100][101] Indeed, Colin Powell, in his address to the U.N. Security Council just prior to the war, made reference to the aluminum tubes. But a report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported that it was highly unlikely that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium. Powell later admitted he had presented an inaccurate case to the United Nations on Iraqi weapons, and the intelligence he was relying on was, in some cases, "deliberately misleading."[102][103][104] Shortly after the United States presidential election, 2008, and the election of rivial democratic party nominee Barack Obama, president Bush admitted that "[my] biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq".[105]
[edit] Authorization for the use of force
In October 2002, a few days before the U.S. Senate voted on the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, about 75 senators were told in closed session that Saddam Hussein had the means of attacking the eastern seaboard of the U.S. with biological or chemical weapons delivered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs.)[36] On February 5, 2003, Colin Powell presented further evidence in his Iraqi WMD program presentation to the UN Security Council that UAVs were ready to be launched against the U.S. At the time, there was a vigorous dispute within the US military and intelligence community as to whether CIA conclusions about Iraqi UAVs were accurate.[106] The U.S. Air Force agency most familiar with UAVs denied that Iraq possessed any offensive UAV capability, saying the few they had were designed for surveillance and intended for reconnaissance.[107] In fact, Iraq's UAV fleet was never deployed and consisted of a handful of outdated 24.5-foot (7.5 m) wingspan drones with no room for more than a camera and video recorder, and no offensive capability.[108] Despite this controversy, the Senate voted to approve the Joint Resolution on October 11, 2002 providing the Bush Administration with the legal basis for the U.S. invasion.
With the support of large bipartisan majorities, the US Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. The resolution asserts the authorization by the Constitution of the United States and the United States Congress for the President to fight anti-United States terrorism. Citing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the resolution reiterated that it should be the policy of the United States to remove the Saddam Hussein regime and promote a democratic replacement. The resolution "supported" and "encouraged" diplomatic efforts by President George W. Bush to "strictly enforce through the U.N. Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" and "obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." The resolution authorized President Bush to use the Armed Forces of the United States "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" in order to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."
Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix remarked in January 2003 that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace."[109] Among other things he noted that 1,000 short tons (910 t) of chemical agent were unaccounted for, information on Iraq's VX nerve agent program was missing, and that "no convincing evidence" was presented for the destruction of 8,500 litres (1,900 imp gal; 2,200 US gal) of anthrax that had been declared.[109] Secretary of State Collin Powell's presentation to the U.N. on February 3, 2003 was designed to influence U.N. members that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. France even believed that Saddam had stockpiles of anthrax and botulism toxin, and the ability to produce VX.[110] But in March, Blix said no evidence of WMDs had been found, and progress had been made in inspections.[38]
In early 2003, the U.S., UK, and Spain proposed the so-called "eighteenth resolution" to give Iraq a deadline for compliance with previous resolutions enforced by the threat of military action. This proposed resolution was subsequently withdrawn due to lack of support on the UN Security Council. In particular, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members France, Germany and Canada together with Russia, were opposed to military intervention in Iraq due to the high level of risk to the international community's security and defended disarmament through diplomacy.[111][112]
[edit] Opposition to invasion
- Further information: criticism of the Iraq War, legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and legality of the Iraq War
On January 20, 2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin declared "we believe that military intervention would be the worst solution."[113] Meanwhile anti-war groups across the world organised public protests. According to French academic Dominique Reynié between January 3 and April 12, 2003, 36 million people across the globe took part in almost 3,000 protests against war in Iraq, the demonstrations on February 15, 2003 being the largest and most prolific.[114]
In February 2003, the U.S. Army's top general, Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it would take "several hundred thousand soldiers" to secure Iraq.[115] Two days later, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the post-war troop commitment would be less than the number of troops required to win the war and, "the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces is far from the mark." Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Shineski's estimate was "way off the mark," because other countries would take part in an occupying force.[116]
In March 2003, Hans Blix reported that, "No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found," in Iraq, saying that progress was made in inspections which would continue.[38] But the U.S. government announced that "diplomacy has failed" and that it would proceed with a coalition of allied countries, named the "coalition of the willing", to rid Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. government abruptly advised U.N. weapons inspectors to immediately pull out of Baghdad.
There were also serious legal questions surrounding the launching of the war against Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war. On September 16, 2004 Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, said of the invasion, "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the U.N. charter. From our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal."[117]
In November 2008 Lord Bingham, the former UK Law Lord, described the war a serious violation of international law, and accused Britain and the US of acting like a "world vigilante". He also criticized the post-invasion record of Britain as "an occupying power in Iraq". Regarding the treatment of Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib, Bingham said: "Particularly disturbing to proponents of the rule of law is the cynical lack of concern for international legality among some top officials in the Bush administration."[118]
[edit] 2003: Invasion
The first CIA team entered Iraq on July 10, 2002.[119] This team was composed of members of the CIA's famed Special Activities Division and was later joined by members of the U.S. Military's elite Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).[120] Together, they prepared for the invasion of conventional U.S. Military forces. These efforts consisted of getting several Iraqi Divisions to surrender rather than oppose the invasion and to identify all of the initial leadership targets during very high risk reconnaissance missions.[120] Most importantly, their efforts organized the Kurdish Peshmerga to become the northern front of the invasion. Together this force defeated Ansar al-Islam in Northern Iraq prior to the invasion and than defeated Saddam's forces in the north.[120][121] The battle against Ansar al-Islam led to the death of a substantial number of terrorists and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat. These terrorists would have been in the subsequent insurgency had they not been eliminated. This battle may have been the Tora Bora of Iraq in some ways, but it was a defeat for Ansar al-Islam and their ally Al Qaeda.[122][119]
At 5:34 AM Baghdad time on March 20, 2003 (9:34 p.m., March 19 EST) the military invasion of Iraq began.[123] The 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, began under the codename "Operation Iraqi Liberation",[124] later renamed "Operation Iraqi Freedom", the UK codename Operation Telic, and the Australian codename Operation Falconer. Coalition forces also cooperated with Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the north. Approximately forty other nations, the "coalition of the willing," participated by providing troops, equipment, services, security, and special forces.
